Punishment and  disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game by Behnk, Sascha et al.
Punishment and disclosure probabilities 
 in an experimental deception game 
 
Sascha Behnka* 
Iván Barreda-Tarrazonab 
Aurora García-Gallegob 
 
a Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, Switzerland 
b LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain 
 
Abstract:  Previous findings have shown that punishment does not necessarily reduce deception in 
principal agent-relationships. We shed further light on this issue by first identifying a punishment 
mechanism that substantially decreases deception in a sender-receiver game: the possibility of imposing 
severe sanctions that are cost-free for the enforcer. Keeping this effective combination of punishment 
costs and severity constant, we then investigate how a reduction in monitoring affects deception by 
comparing assured revelation of sender behavior ex post with a treatment in which it is disclosed with 
just 50% probability. We find a similarly strong deterrence effect in both treatments suggesting that 
punishment works in a particular way in the deception context: once it is a credible threat, it does not 
require complete monitoring to be effective. We also find that receivers show similar trust levels in 
senders’ messages for both punishment treatments, which are significantly higher than in the 
corresponding baselines without sanctions, further supporting our conclusion. 
 
Keywords: deception; punishment; disclosure probability, experiment 
JEL Classifications: D03; D63; K42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Contact information: Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich,  
  Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland. Phone: +41 44 634 19 03. Email: sascha.behnk@bf.uzh.ch. 
1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A large number of studies provide evidence that the possibility of being punished is a strong incentive to 
comply with social norms in human societies and that this mechanism to enhance cooperation is widely 
preferred to sanction-free settings (Gürerk et al., 2006). How strong the human appetite for penalizing 
unfair actions is can be best represented by the fact that people are willing to incur substantial costs in 
order to punish selfish individuals (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002), even when punishers are not directly 
exposed to the negative consequences of the norm defection (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Beside 
economic motivations in terms of avoiding a fine, the simple fact that victims or observers can take actions 
against the person breaking the norm seems to entail emotional discomfort that can keep individuals from 
defection (Fehr and Gächter,  2000,  Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009). Furthermore, the willingness to 
enforce punishment seems to be sensitive to the type of underlying social dilemma (Molenmaker et al., 
2015). 
We contribute to the discussion of punishment in different contexts by investigating its effect on 
deception in principal-agent relationships (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Compared to the large 
experimental literature on punishment effects in cooperation problems, such as public goods, there exists 
only a reduced number of studies investigating the impact of sanctions on economic deception, although it 
is a prevailing problem with long-term repercussions in everyday life (Akerlof, 1970). Furthermore, the 
majority of these studies shows that punishment does not lead to less deception in this particular context 
(see for instance Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007, or Peeters et al., 2013).1 Overall, the findings in the 
literature indicate that punishment is not a one-size-fits-all measure to successfully reduce deception, an 
issue that needs further exploration in the light of policy makers’ attempts to tackle the prevailing 
problem of economic fraud. 
We first identify a well-functioning punishment mechanism in a sender-receiver game identical in the 
other features to the design used in Behnk et al. (2014). In their article, the authors report experimental 
results on how ex post disclosure of conflicts of interest affects a principal-agent setting in which 
deception is possible, but they do not consider punishment. They showed that a 50% probability of 
disclosing sender behavior after the game was played significantly reduced deception through image 
concerns in case the sender obtained a small gain at the expense of a comparatively big loss for his 
counterpart. In our experiment, apart from replicating the basic design of Behnk et al. (2014), we allowed 
receivers to severely punish dishonest senders, without incurring monetary enforcement costs. We chose 
this particular calibration based on our literature review which indicates that costs and severity are not 
only crucial parameters for the general credibility of punishment with regard to deception but also for it 
to have an effect at all in this context. 
Within this design, we address a factor of fundamental importance for the efficiency of a sanctioning 
system in environments with information asymmetries: the probability with which defection is revealed. 
A typical feature of economic cooperation problems as represented, for instance, in public goods games, is 
                                                 
1 In general, punishment seems to be sensitive to the environment in which it is applied to foster cooperation. Contrary to the public 
goods setting, punishment can even reduce pro-social behavior in other social dilemmas, such as trust games (Fehr and Rockenbach, 
2003). 
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the possibility to detect free-riders at the end of an interaction without bearing monitoring costs. In 
contrast, deception is linked to an exploitation of asymmetric information and, hence, victims are not 
always fully aware of the miserable consequences in the direct aftermath of an economic interaction. 
Famous examples are Akerlof's (1970) lemon market or the selling of sub-optimal products in the 
financial services sector (Angelova and Regner, 2013). The possibility to find out about the honesty or 
dishonesty of others is therefore particularly crucial in such principal-agent relationships. Since perfect 
monitoring of agent behavior can be costly, if not impossible, the question that arises is whether the 
deterrence effect of a punishment mechanism can be sufficiently severe to keep agents from deception 
even if their honesty or dishonesty is not disclosed to the principals in each and every case. 
To shed further light on this issue, we used two treatments in which receivers were able to punish 
dishonest senders and across which we varied the disclosure probability. In one of the treatments, 
receivers always found out about their sender's honesty or dishonesty and each receiver had the 
possibility to monetarily punish her sender in case she had accepted a dishonest message. In the second 
treatment, a receiver could sanction a dishonest sender under the same conditions in case the payoff 
structure was revealed to her, which happened only with 50% probability. For each of the two treatments 
we used as a baseline the Behnk et al. (2014) data, obtained without punishment but with the same 
corresponding probabilities of sender behavior disclosure.2 As a theoretical framework, we perform an 
expected utility analysis, which predicts that our punishment mechanism should lead to a lower rate of 
honest messages when the probability of revealing sender behavior ex post is halved. 
Furthermore, Eisenkopf et al. (2011) have shown that the size of a lie matters for receivers in the sense 
that senders were punished harder the more they tried to gain from a lie. We address this issue from the 
sender's point of view regarding two types of lies, a lie that leads to deception and a lie that promotes an 
equalization of payoffs on a Pareto-dominated level, in the modified version of Gneezy's (2005) deception 
game that we are using. The application of a punishment mechanism to different payoff scenarios in a 
within-subject setting enables us to examine in detail how various monetary temptations and different 
consequences for their counterparts influence the senders' behavior when punishment is possible 
regarding the two types of lies. 
In contrast to many previous results in the literature, we find that senders chose honest messages 
substantially more often in all scenarios of our punishment treatments compared to the baselines, 
confirming the efficacy of our punishment system. Strikingly, we do not observe a significant difference in 
the fractions of honest messages in any of our payoff scenarios comparing assured revelation with 50% 
disclosure probability. The stable deterrence effect of punishment, which we observe, implies that 
individual monitoring effort in such principal-agent relationships could be reduced while maintaining a 
similar level of honesty.  
Our within-subject comparison of different payoff scenarios reveals that the deterrence effect of 
punishment is always significant but less strong when senders are able to gain a comparatively high 
                                                 
2 In contrast to previous studies on punishment in environments with asymmetric information, such as deception games, our design 
provides an additional advantage since the ex post disclosure of norm defections, which is necessary for the enforcement of 
punishments, is also present in the baselines. This setting enables us to tell apart the pure deterrence effect of punishment from the 
image concerns caused by disclosure. 
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amount from deception. On the other hand, differences in the financial consequences for the receiver do 
not significantly affect sender decisions in our punishment setting. We also find that the second 
alternative to honesty, sending payoff-equalizing messages, even if frequently chosen in the baselines, 
nearly disappears with the possibility of punishment. Our analysis of individual beliefs reveals that 
punishment works as a positive selection screen in our design since it eliminates strategic sender actions 
in terms of falsely promoting an equal outcome in order to actually maximize profits. 
In line with sender behavior, receivers show substantially higher trust levels when severe and cost-free 
punishment is possible. This is an important condition since an economic relationship can only be 
established if all involved parties actually agree to interact with each other. Furthermore, we do not find a 
significant difference in acceptance rates between the two punishment treatments, implying that receivers 
anticipate the similarly strong deterrence effect of punishment under both disclosure probabilities, 
independently of the low ex post enforcement rates that we observe. These similarly high trust levels 
further support our notion that the deterrence effect of our punishment mechanism allows for a reduction 
in the principals' agency costs. 
Altogether, our findings indicate that punishment works in a particular way in the deception context, 
which should be taken into account by policy-makers in the development of efficient measures against 
fraud: once punishment is a credible threat, it does not require complete monitoring in order to be 
effective. By analyzing subjects' beliefs and punishment considerations, we can rule out a change in 
strategic components and suggest that the stable deterrence is observed due to anticipated psychological 
costs of being punished for deception. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we review the related literature. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and procedures. Hypotheses are derived from an expected utility analysis in section 
4. In section 5 we present our results and section 6 concludes. The experimental instructions can be found 
in the appendix. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The study of Brandts and Charness (2003) is one of the first experimental investigations that introduced 
punishment in a principal-agent-relationship in which deception is possible. The authors examined if 
intentions play a role when people decide whether to sanction their counterparts. They found that 
receivers were indeed more inclined to punish senders when the selfish act was preceded by a deceptive 
message. Their results indicate that a decision about whether to enforce a sanction is not only influenced 
by the financial loss caused by the unfair action but also by the way the counterpart intended to obtain his 
earnings (see also Eisenkopf et al., 2011). 
The number of experimental studies that investigate deterrence in the deception context by comparing 
punishment settings with sanction-free baselines is limited and shows mixed results. In Appendix A, we 
summarize the parameters and findings of these selected studies. The first group of articles does not find a 
significant reduction in deception when agents face the possibility of being sanctioned for deceiving their 
principals. Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) used a repeated sender-receiver game with alternating 
roles in which both players' payoffs were reduced to zero in case the receiver punished her counterpart. 
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Although receivers showed more trust when punishment was possible, the authors did not find a 
significant difference in truth-telling between their baseline and the punishment treatment. Sánchez-
Pagés and Vorsatz (2009) found the same pattern in a subsequent study in which senders had the 
possibility to remain silent as an alternative to sending a message to the receiver. Peeters et al. (2013) 
modified the design of Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) by randomly assigning subjects to settings with 
and without punishment and allowing players to choose between these institutions in later stages. Again, 
they found no overall difference in truth-telling with and without punishment. By analyzing subgroups of 
punishers and non-punishers, they showed that only in the self-selected punisher group the truth was told 
significantly more often when sanctioning was possible. Furthermore, Church and Kuang (2009) 
investigated how deception is affected by sanctions in combination with ex ante disclosure of conflicting 
interests, which can increase deceptive behavior through "moral licensing” (Cain et al., 2005). Receivers 
had to estimate an unknown value and received an advice from a better informed sender. In case a 
receiver punished a dishonest sender, she incurred a relatively low cost of 10% of her initial endowment 
and the sender's earnings were reduced to a comparably low extent, that is, by one quarter of his initial 
endowment. The possibility to get punished alone did not reduce the bias in the senders’ advice. 
On the other hand, the sanctioning system led to a significant reduction in the bias when receivers were 
informed about the senders’ conflict of interest from the beginning. Their explanation for this effect is that 
"with common knowledge of incentives, sanctions provide a real threat that regulates behavior" (Church 
and Kuang, 2009: p. 512). Xiao (2013) also found a deterrence effect of punishment in a deception game 
with cost-free third-party punishment, which halved the sender's payoffs in case it was enforced. 
Deception rates decreased when receivers observed whether the enforcer decided to punish the sender 
before making their decisions. However, when enforcers were able to gain profits from punishing senders 
or when receivers were not aware of the punishment possibility, sanctions did not reduce deception 
compared to the baseline. With this design, Xiao provides evidence for the importance of the 
communication function of punishment regarding social norms.3 
Kimbrough and Rubin (2013) found a positive effect of punishment in a dynamic environment. The 
authors used a repeated trust game with pre-play messages in order to compare the effects of costly in-
group punishment depending on a jury decision and the provision of information about the other group 
members' behavior. In case of a positive jury decision, the deceiver had to pay the outstanding amount 
plus the cost of one fifth of the initial endowment that the victim had to disburse for initiating the jury 
process. They found that players deceived significantly less when the sanctioning system was applied and 
that both factors, punishment and information provision, worked in a mutually reinforcing way. While 
information sharing led to reputation building over time, punishment reduced deception already from the 
beginning, implying that its deterrence effect is not affected by repeated interactions. In another dynamic 
setting, Reuben and Stephenson (2013) showed that lying became unprofitable over time since players 
were inclined to report deceivers to a central authority in order to get them punished. However, when 
                                                 
e In a subsequent study, Xiao and Tan (2014) showed that the suboptimal effect of profitable punishment can be overcome when 
punishers have to justify their decisions. 
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members were able to select who else to include in their group, whistle-blowers were often avoided, 
leading to groups in which the sanctioning mechanism lost its functionality.4 
Altogether, previous experiments led to mixed results regarding the deterrence effect of punishment in 
the deception setting. It is striking that in those studies which do not show an effect of sanctions on 
deception punishment either includes substantial costs for the enforcer (Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 
2007, 2009, Peeters et al., 2013) or leads to comparably slight consequences for punished senders 
(Church and Kuang, 2009). Here, punishment only affected sender behavior positively in case the 
credibility of its threat was increased, e.g. through self-selection into a punishment institution or ex-ante 
disclosure of conflicts of interest. Although the results are not directly comparable, due to different design 
features that might have influenced the anticipation of being punished in various ways, we can conclude 
that effective sanctioning of deceptive behavior is related to a strong reduction in earnings and a 
comparatively low cost for the enforcer. This tendency is in line with Egas and Riedl (2008) and 
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) who found that decreasing enforcement costs and, respectively, a higher 
severity of sanctions enhance cooperation. In order to reflect this tendency in our design, we use a 
punishment mechanism that reduces the final earnings of a dishonest sender considerably while, at the 
same time, its enforcement is cost-free for receivers. 
Subsequently, we use this design to investigate how the probability with which a receiver learns about a 
sender's honesty or dishonesty affects deterrence. The economic analysis of detection probabilities goes 
back to Becker's (1968) seminal work about the temptation to enrich oneself through a criminal act and 
the threat of negative consequences in case of being caught. The author predicts that less people become 
criminals when the probability or the severity of punishment increases, based on economic rationality and 
depending on risk attitudes. A large body of theoretical and empirical studies has discussed this issue so 
far, leading to different, sometimes even contrasting results. Although increasing the profitability of 
alternatives to crime has in general a higher impact than certainty and severity (Carroll, 1978), a number 
of empirical studies provides evidence for a positive relationship between detection probability and crime 
reduction, for instance regarding free-riding in public transportation (Killias et al., 2009). Other studies 
find contradictory results in the sense that crime rates actually increase with a higher probability of 
detection (e.g. Myers, 1983). Paternoster (1987) provides an overview of early studies and discusses the 
used methodologies.  
While certainty and severity of punishment exhibit interaction effects (Stafford et al., 1986), some 
experimental investigations confirm a relatively higher importance of detection probabilities, for instance 
in Nagin and Pogarsky (2006) while others show the opposite effect (Anderson and Stafford, 2003, 
Friesen, 2012). Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair (2012) compare severity and certainty of sanctions 
using an experimental stealing game and obtain results that contradict Becker's (1968) predictions, 
except for the presence of very strong incentives. Given these inconclusive findings and the particular role 
of punishment in the deception context, indicated by previous studies, we are interested in the effect of 
punishment on deception in a sender-receiver game with different probabilities of ex post disclosure. 
                                                 
4 Punishment was also used in other contexts that include information transmission, for instance, to investigate the effect of 
confessions (Utikal, 2012) and apologies (Fischbacher and Utikal, 2013) on individual behavior. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We use data coming from the anonymous two-player sender-receiver game with ex post disclosure of 
Behnk et al. (2014) as our baselines and also from two treatments, with the same respective probabilities 
of sender behavior disclosure, run specifically for this study in which we allow receivers to punish 
dishonest senders in an otherwise identical setting. 
3.1 Sender-receiver game 
In this one-shot deception game, all subjects were randomly assigned the role of either a sender or a 
receiver, neutrally named Player 1 and Player 2. A sender and a receiver from the same session were 
randomly matched. The sender was then provided with information about the payoffs that both players 
could get from a set of options. The receiver's task was to implement one of the options without having 
any information about the corresponding payoffs and by doing so she was determining both player's 
payoffs. In this situation of information asymmetry, the sender transmitted a message to the receiver in 
which he recommended one of the options as the one that provided the highest payoff for the receiver. 
This message could either be honest or a lie and, since payoffs were misaligned, the sender had an 
economic incentive to be dishonest. 
We used the strategy method and presented three different payoff scenarios to the sender. Each scenario 
included three options with a payoff for each player as shown in Table 1.6 The scenarios were based on 
Gneezy's (2005) seminal design in combination with a Pareto-dominated third option similar to Rode 
(2010) and Angelova and Regner (2013). We added the dominated option to reduce the effect of 
"deception by telling the truth" (Sutter, 2009).  
Scenario Option Payoff sender Payoff receiver 
1 
(low+;low-) 
A 5 6 
B 6 5 
C 3 3 
2 
(low+;high-) 
A 5 15 
B 6 5 
C 3 3 
3 
(high+;high-) 
A 5 15 
B 15 5 
C 3 3 
    Table 1 
    Sender and receiver payoffs by scenario and option (in euros). 
While the dominated option C always provided an equal payoff of three euros to both players, their 
interests were misaligned between options A and B and the intensity of this misalignment varied across 
scenarios. In scenario 1, a successful deception led to a comparatively low additional gain of one euro for 
the sender compared to an equally low loss for the receiver. For this reason, we labeled this scenario 
                                                 
6 The scenarios were presented on different screens and we controlled for order effects regarding their appearance as well as for the 
option order within a scenario. Receivers only saw the general structure of the scenarios and options without payoff information in 
the experimental instructions (see Appendix B). 
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(low+,low-).7 In scenario 2, the sender obtained the same profit from implementing option B as in scenario 
1 but now at the expense of a higher comparative loss of ten euros for his counterpart (low+,high-). 
Finally, in scenario 3, the sender was able to gain an additional profit of ten euros from option B, which is 
higher than in the other two scenarios, at the cost of his counterpart's loss which is equally high as in 
scenario 2 (high+,high-). In each of the payoff scenarios, the sender selected one of the following three 
messages to be sent to the receiver afterwards: 
Message 1: Option A will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 2: Option B will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 3: Option C will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Since each of the three options provided a different payoff to the receiver, only one of the three messages 
was true (henceforth called "honest message"). The remaining messages were lies that can be 
characterized by their payoff structure as a "deceptive message" in case the sender recommended the 
option that provided him with the highest payoff within a scenario and as a "payoff-equalizing" message 
when referring to the option that provided equal payoffs on a low level for both players. 
After the sender chose a message in each payoff scenario, the computer randomly selected one of the 
scenarios and sent the corresponding message to the receiver, who either accepted or rejected it. In case 
the receiver accepted the message, the recommended option was implemented and determined the 
payoffs for both players. In case of rejection, one of the two non-recommended options was randomly 
implemented by the computer. 
Before informing them about the implemented option and presenting them their payoffs, we elicited the 
subject's beliefs.8 We asked senders to estimate the percentage of receivers who would accept the 
received message in their session. In turn, receivers were asked about the percentage of senders who had 
transmitted honest messages in their session. These first-order beliefs are the basis for the subjective 
equilibrium analysis which we apply to the punishment treatments in section 3 of this study. 
Furthermore, we elicited a more individual form of these beliefs by asking senders if they expected their 
counterpart to accept the message and by asking receivers if they believed that they had received an 
honest message from the sender they were matched with. 
We also elicited both player types' second-order beliefs about relative payoffs by asking how much they 
thought their counterpart expected to gain from the message relative to their own payoffs in five 
categories (“much less”, “less”, “equal”, “more” and “much more”). In order to elicit the players' peer group 
expectations, which could be interpreted as a kind of social norm, we presented the three scenarios again 
to the senders and asked them to estimate in four categories how likely they believed it was that other 
senders had chosen a message that favored themselves in the respective scenario ("very unlikely", 
"unlikely", "likely" and "very likely"). In turn, without knowing the payoff scenarios, receivers were asked 
                                                 
7 The label indicates how much senders earn (+) and receivers lose (-) from option B compared to option A. 
8 A variety of studies have shown the importance of belief elicitation in this context, such as Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), 
Peeters et al. (2012) and López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2013). 
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about how likely they believed it was that other receivers in their session had accepted the message which 
was transmitted to them by their counterpart. 
After the game was played, we asked senders in the punishment treatments to what extent they had taken 
into account the possibility that their counterpart would punish them when deciding which message to 
send (not at all, not so much, much, very much). Using the same scale, receivers were asked to what extent 
they considered how much money their counterpart made them lose when deciding whether to punish 
him. 
3.2 Treatments 
The experiment encompassed four treatments among which both the possibility to punish dishonest 
senders and the disclosure probability was manipulated, as summarized in Table 2. T-treatments and the 
respective data from Behnk et al. (2014) are used in this study as baselines without punishment. Both of 
them included ex-post disclosure in the sense that the receiver found out about the honesty or dishonesty 
of the sender with a certain probability after the game was played. Particularly, in T100 the receiver was 
always shown her own payoff on the final screen and, additionally, all payoffs of both players in each of 
the options in the scenario that had been selected. In T50, the probability of this additional disclosure was 
only 50%. In all treatments both player types were informed about the ex post transparency and the 
corresponding probability in the experimental instructions (See Appendix). This setup ensures that 
receivers did not only find out about the honesty or dishonesty of their counterpart after the game was 
played in the punishment settings but also in the sanction-free baselines. Therefore, we are able to tell 
apart the sanctioning system's deterrence effect from the image concerns caused by the disclosure, which 
alone can lead to less deception (Behnk et al., 2014). 
  Treatments 
Nº of 
subjects 
% of female 
subjects 
  T100  -  subsequent disclosure 
  Payoff revelation with 100% probability 
144 56% 
  T50  -  50% subsequent disclosure 
  Payoff revelation with 50% probability 
168 61% 
  P100  -  subsequent disclosure and punishment 
  T100 with option to punish dishonesty 
60 57% 
  P50  -  50% subsequent disclosure and punishment 
  T50 with option to punish dishonesty 
64 50% 
 
      Table 2 
      Treatments, number of subjects and percentages of female subjects. 
P-treatments are the equivalents to the T-treatments with the receiver being able to cost-free punish her 
sender by reducing the sender's payoff to 2 euros.9 In P100, where a receiver always found out about the 
sender's honesty or dishonesty, she was able to sanction the sender in case she accepted a dishonest 
                                                 
9 An additional reason for the relatively strong financial punishment is that there would not have been a sanctioning threat for 
choosing the payoff-equalizing message if punishment would have reduced the payoff to an amount equal to or higher than 3 euros. 
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message. In the P50 treatment, a receiver could sanction a dishonest sender only in case the payoff 
structure was revealed to her, which happened with 50% probability. There was no possibility for 
retaliation or reputation building since the game was played only once. 
A receiver was not able to punish dishonest behavior after rejecting a message in our experiment, similar 
to previous studies (e.g. Brandts and Charness, 2003). In this aspect, our design differs from the common 
view in many legal frameworks, that even an attempt to harm others can be penalized, without the need 
for it to be successful. However, this rule does not apply to lies per se in the sense that a person, who does 
not tell the truth, can only be held responsible in a legal way for causing damage in case others base their 
actual behavior on the lie, except for special cases like perjury. For instance, in a situation in which an 
advisor recommends a financial product to an investor, rejecting this recommendation can be interpreted 
as a cancellation of the economic relationship between both parties. Such a situation is not in the focus of 
the present experiment which investigates the effect of punishment on lies that lead to a reduction in 
financial rewards of other. Furthermore, studies like Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) and Peeters et al. 
(2013) have shown that the willingness to punish dishonesty does not only depend on the action of the 
defector but also on the behavior of the potential punisher. In their experiments, the sanction rate after 
the sequence lie-distrust was comparatively low, indicating that this action sequence was not worth 
punishing for the vast majority of their subjects. 
3.3 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the LEE - Laboratory of Experimental Economics at University Jaume I, 
Castellon, Spain. Altogether, 436 undergraduate students from different faculties were recruited with the 
Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Ten approximately 45 
minutes lasting sessions were run - three in each T-treatment and two in each P-treatment. This led to a 
total number of 144 and 168 subjects in the T-treatments as well as 60 and 64 subjects in the P-
treatments. As presented in Table 2, the sample is almost balanced between men and women. 
Upon arrival, subjects entered the laboratory one by one and chose a seat in front of a computer. The 
experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the player roles were randomly assigned 
to the seats. After the experimental instructions were read aloud the subjects answered a control question 
using the computers. In case some subjects did not answer correctly, one of the experimenters went to 
their seats and explained the instructions individually to ensure a full understanding of the game. After 
the experiment, we paid the subjects anonymously in cash. The average earnings were around €10. 
4. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
With our experimental design, we seek to explore behavior in a sender-receiver game with punishment 
and different disclosure probabilities. We derive our hypotheses regarding sender behavior from an 
expected utility analysis. In each scenario i ∊ {1,2,3}, the sender selects a message mi to be sent to his 
counterpart, promoting one option from the set of options Z = {A(honest), B(deceptive), C(payoff-
equalizing)} which provide monetary payoffs πi(z) > 0. Since senders gain the highest payoff from 
successful deception and both payoffs from deception and honesty are greater than the one from payoff-
equalization in every scenario, we set πi(B) > πi(A) > πi(C) for the sender. The receiver, although not 
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provided with information about the payoffs from accepting each of the possible messages, has a say in 
the outcome by either accepting or rejecting the message, an element that a rational sender takes into 
account. Therefore, we add the sender's first order beliefs to our analysis in terms of the subjective 
probability p ∊ [0,1] with which he believes the receiver will accept the message. The sender's expected 
utility EUT under risk neutrality in the T-treatments obtained from sending message mi = z is reproduced 
in equation (1).10 
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as shown in Appendix C and illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
  Figure 1 
  Sender's expected utility from sending messages in the scenarios of the T-treatments. 
In the P-treatments, the receiver has the cost-free possibility to sanction her counterpart after accepting a 
dishonest message by reducing his payoff from the implemented option to πS < πi(z). Since sending an 
honest message cannot be punished, the sender's expected utility from this action is the same as in the T-
treatments. On the other hand, the expected utility from sending a deceptive or a payoff-equalizing 
                                                 
10 In Behnk et al. (2014) psychological costs of lying Li are included in the model. Since the authors did not find a significant 
difference in the message rates between the treatments with assured revelation and 50% disclosure probability, we assume here 
that Li do not vary across treatments either. When Li are assumed to be positive, we find a positive range of p-values in which honesty 
becomes a dominant strategy in the T-treatments and an identical range for the P-treatments if the subjective probability of 
punishment q is zero, since subsequent disclosure of sender behavior is present in all of our treatments. Therefore, we assume in the 
following for simplicity that Li = 0. 
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message depends on the sender's subjective probability q ∊ [0,1] of the receiver punishing him after 
sending one of these two message types in P100, which we include in equation (2). 
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In P50, the possibility to punish also depends on the 50% disclosure probability in the sense that a 
receiver can sanction a liar after acceptance of his message only if she becomes aware of his dishonesty, 
thanks to probabilistic disclosure, as included in equation (3). 
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We show that sending honest messages becomes a dominant strategy for specific p-ranges in the 
punishment treatments, and that these ranges are wider in P100 than in P50, by comparing the 
intersections of the expected utility functions among the treatments. 
Let us define two indifference values of p: 
pAB : the value of p at which the expected utility from truth-telling EUT(A) = EUT(B), 
 the expected utility from sending a deceptive message.  
pAC :  the value of p at which EUT(A) = EUT(C), the expected utility from sending a  
 payoff-equalizing message.  
In equation (4), we show that in the T-treatments the difference is zero between pAC, up to which sending 
payoff-equalizing messages dominates, and pAB, as of which sending deceptive messages dominates, 
leaving no value of p for which honesty provides the highest expected utility. The same is true for the P-
treatments when q = 0, i.e., in case senders do not expect to be punished for dishonesty. 
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However, if a sender believes that q > 0, positive value ranges of p exist that increase with q and within 
which honesty is the dominant strategy in the P-treatments. This is shown in equations (5) and (6), in 
which we compare the values of p of the expected utility function intersections among the T-treatments 
and P100: 
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The difference pAB,T - pAB,P100 is negative since π
A
 > π
B
and πi(B) > πS, which is equivalent to a rightward 
shift of the intersection point in P100 compared to the T-treatments, with punishment reducing the p-
range within which sending deceptive messages is a dominant strategy. Correspondingly, the difference  
pAC,T - pAC,P100 is positive since π
A
 < π
C
as well as πi(C) > πS and reflects a leftward shift of the intersection 
point in P100 compared to the T-treatments, which leads to a comparatively smaller p-range within which 
sending payoff-equalizing messages dominates. As a consequence, truth-telling dominates between both 
intersection points pAC,P100 and pAB,P100 in P100. The same pattern appears regarding P50 as shown in 
equations (7) and (8): 
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(8) 
Figure 2 illustrates this pattern in the punishment treatments for a selection of q-values. We show the 
pattern for representation reasons in scenario 3. While equalizing messages still dominate on the left side 
of the p-distributions, sending deceptive messages can even become a completely dominated action when 
the expected probability of punishment q is sufficiently high. Therefore, we expect to find a higher level of 
honesty in P100 compared to T100 and in P50 compared to T50. 
H1: Senders are more likely to send honest messages in the P-treatments compared to the respective 
baselines. 
It is straightforward to show that the p-range in which truth-telling dominates is comparatively smaller in 
scenario 3, where a sender can obtain a higher payoff from deceiving his counterpart than in the other two 
scenarios, for the same value of q. In Appendix C, we present the respective ranges of p applied to the 
scenario-specific payoffs in the P-treatments. This continues to be true if we allow for the possibility of the 
sender assigning different qi to different payoff scenarios.11 In such a case, it would be reasonable to 
assume that the sender assigns q a higher value in scenario 2 than in scenario 3, since the receiver's 
relative loss does not differ between the two scenarios, but the sender gains comparably less from 
deception in scenario 2, and could therefore assume that it is more likely to be punished for dishonesty in 
this 'mean' scenario. Hence, we hypothesize that the higher the potential payoff from deception, keeping 
the receivers' payoffs constant, the less inclined senders will be to send honest messages when 
punishment is possible. 
H2: In the P-treatments, senders are more likely to send honest messages in scenario 2 compared to    
scenario 3. 
Besides the different financial temptations among the scenarios, we are also interested in the sender's 
sensitivity to the harm he causes to his counterpart with successful deception under the punishment 
mechanism. We know from Gneezy (2005) that individuals take into account the negative consequences of 
                                                 
11 In general, the influence of the different payoff scenarios on the senders' expected q should be limited since we do not provide 
receivers with information about the payoffs in the non-selected scenarios. 
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deception for others, which can be represented by higher costs of lying Li in scenario 2 than in scenario 1. 
Hence, when we give up our simplicity assumption of zero costs of lying, this would lead to a wider p-
range in which honesty becomes a dominant strategy in scenario 2 compared to scenario 1, as shown in 
Appendix C.  
 
Figure 2 
Sender’s expected utility in P100 and P50 with low (q = 0.4) and high (q = 0.8) subjective punishment probability q 
in scenario 3. 
Furthermore, if a sender adjusts qi 
among the scenarios, it is reasonable to assume that he assigns qi a 
higher value in scenario 2 than in scenario 1, due to the receiver's higher relative loss in scenario 2. The 
adjustment of qi 
would lead to an even wider p-range in which honesty dominates in scenario 2 compared 
to scenario 1. Therefore, we hypothesize that a sender is less inclined to lie when deception causes a 
greater harm to his counterpart in the presence of punishment possibilities.12 
H3: In the P-treatments, senders are more likely to send honest messages in scenario 2 compared to    
scenario 1. 
                                                 
12 The comparison between scenarios 1 and 3 remains undefined since we do not know the relative strength of two possibly 
conflicting effects: On the one hand, senders have lower financial incentives to be dishonest in scenario 1 compared to scenario 3, 
while, at the same time, the reduced relative harm to the receiver might decrease the perceived punishment probability q and lead to 
more dishonest messages in scenario 1. 
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Finally, we can demonstrate that a decreasing probability of disclosing dishonesty reduces the p-range in 
which honesty is a dominant strategy in our setting by comparing the intersections of the expected utility 
functions between the P-treatments. We obtain that PABP,50 < PAB,P100 for all q > 0 as represented in     
equation (9) since πi(B) > πi(A) > πS and, hence, whenever the sender expects to be punished by the 
receiver with a positive probability, the p-range in which sending a deceptive message dominates is wider 
in P50 than in P100 as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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(9) 
Accordingly, we obtain that pAC,P50 > pAC,P100 for all q > 0 since πi(A) > πi(C) > πS as shown in equation (10) 
and, hence, that the p-range in which sending a payoff-equalizing message dominates is also wider in P50 
than in P100. 
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(10) 
Regarding the effectiveness of punishment with different disclosure probabilities, we conclude that 
senders are expected to be honest for smaller p-ranges in P50 compared to P100 if q > 0, independently of 
the payoff scenario and the amount to which the sender's earnings are reduced by punishment, as long as 
πS < πi(z). 
H4: Senders are more likely to send honest messages in P100 than in P50. 
We turn now to the analysis of receiver behavior by asking whether these subjects trust their 
counterparts more often when they are able to punish them for dishonesty compared to a situation 
without the possibility of sanctioning. Receivers are blind regarding payoffs in our design and so we are 
not able to apply a similar subjective equilibrium analysis to this player type. The receiver's decision 
depends on her beliefs about the probability r ∊ [0,1] with which her counterpart has sent an honest 
message. If the receiver expects r to be greater than 0.5, she maximizes her expected payoffs by accepting 
this message and vice versa in the T-treatments. A receiver is indifferent between accepting and rejecting 
a message in case r = 0.5. We hypothesize that receivers will anticipate the deterrence effect of potential 
punishment predicted by our analysis, i.e., that receivers will show more trust in the senders’ message in 
P100 compared to T100 and in P50 compared to T50. 
H5: Receivers are more likely to accept the message in the P-treatments compared to the baselines. 
In line with our previous results, we further expect that receivers will anticipate a higher lying rate when 
the probability of disclosing dishonesty decreases and will trust their counterparts therefore more often 
in P100 compared to P50. 
H6: Receivers are more likely to accept the message in P100 than in P50. 
15 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Sender behavior 
This section reports the senders' behavior in terms of their message choices in the three scenarios of each 
treatment as summarized in Figure 3. In contrast to many other punishment systems against deceptive 
behavior used in the experimental literature, we find that the presence of our severe and cost-free 
sanctions enhances pro-social behavior substantially, while we control for image effects by also using 
subsequent disclosure in our baselines. According to chi2 tests, the rates of honest messages are higher in 
all scenarios of P100 compared to T100, and in P50 compared to T50, with significances at the 0.01 level. 
Hence, we find support for our hypothesis H1. 
Result 1: Senders select the honest message more often in the treatments with severe and cost-free sanctions 
compared to the baselines without punishment. 
 
    Figure 3 
    Fractions of messages chosen by senders per scenario and treatment. 
In scenarios 1 and 2 of the P-treatments, the rates of honest messages vary between 78% and 88%. In 
P50, significantly fewer senders, 66%, act honestly in the third scenario, in which the sender can gain a 
comparatively higher amount from deception, according to a McNemar test that we used for this within-
subject comparison (difference between scenarios 1 and 3: p= 0.035; difference between scenarios 2 and 
3: p= 0.046). In P100, the difference between scenarios 1 and 3 is marginally significant (p=0.096) but not 
significant between scenarios 2 and 3. These results confirm our H2 partially in the sense that our 
punishment mechanism is less effective in reducing deception with high stakes in some cases, in line with 
the scenario comparison in Gneezy (2005). On the other hand, we do not find any significant differences 
between scenarios 1 and 2, in which the receiver suffers a comparatively higher loss. Therefore, we cannot 
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confirm our H3. As the receiver is always entitled to sanction with the same severity after a disclosed 
successful lie, independently from the harm received, the sender seems to anticipate a similar frequency 
of punishment in both scenarios. 
Result 2: When punishment is possible, senders choose honest messages relatively less often when they can 
gain a comparatively higher amount from deception. However, their decisions are not significantly affected 
by a variation in the negative consequences for their counterparts. 
We turn now to the question of how the probability with which the payoff distribution is revealed to the 
receivers influences the deterrence effect. We compare the rates of honest messages within the two 
treatment families, which we define as punishment and no-punishment settings. Punishment induces a 
strong incentive for being honest and should therefore lead to a lower rate of honest messages when the 
probability of revealing sender behavior is halved in P50, as predicted by our expected utility analysis. 
Interestingly, we do not observe a significant difference in the fractions of honest messages in any of the 
scenarios between P50 and P100 and, hence, cannot confirm our H4. Senders are not affected by the 
difference in probabilities of their behavior being revealed and punishment becoming possible after 
sending dishonest messages. This finding implies that by using severe and cost-free punishment in such 
principal-agent relationships, monitoring effort could be reduced  while maintaining the level of honesty 
almost as in the case of complete disclosure. 
Result 3: Independently of the different disclosure probability, we find the same pronounced deterrence 
effects in both P-treatments in each payoff scenario. 
Accordingly, senders deceive their counterparts less when punishment is possible.13 The rate of deceptive 
messages is lower in all scenarios in the P-treatments compared to the respective baselines with 
significances at the 0.01 level. Altogether, between 9% and 30% of the senders choose a deceptive 
message in our punishment settings. In the case of 50% disclosure, it is possible that risk-loving subjects 
take into account the possibility of not being revealed in the end of the game and therefore choose to 
deceive their counterpart. However, this strategy would not explain the rates of deceptive messages in 
P100, with up to 27% of deception, where the revelation of deception is unavoidable. These players seem 
to believe that their counterparts will not punish them either because of a general lack of interest in 
sanctioning or a possible discomfort they experience when reducing the sender's payoff to a very low 
level. Let us recall that sanctioning does not entail any financial cost for the receiver but also no financial 
gain. As we describe section 5.2, a substantial fraction of the receivers is indeed not punishing senders 
although being in the position to enforce a sanction. 
With regard to the payoff-equalizing messages, our subjective equilibrium analysis predicts that in 
treatments without punishment, sending this message type is a dominant strategy for risk-neutral senders 
who expect their counterparts to trust them with a subjective acceptance probability of p < 0.33. In line 
with these predictions, this alternative to honesty is frequently chosen, up to 21%, in the T-treatments. On 
the other hand, this message type nearly disappears with punishment. We find the highest rate, 6%, in 
scenario 2 of P50 while in scenario 1 of P100 none of the senders selected a payoff-equalizing message. 
                                                 
13 This distinction is necessary since deception is not the only alternative to being honest in our design. Senders were also able to 
choose payoff-equalizing messages. 
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According to chi2 tests, the respective fractions in the P-treatments are significantly lower than in 
treatments without sanctioning, except for scenario 2.  
Let us recall from our theoretical analysis that the higher the disclosure probability, the smaller the 
dominance range of payoff-equalizing messages, i.e., fewer senders would maximize their expected utility 
by sending this message type. However, we find that varying the disclosure probabilities does again not 
influence sender behavior in our setting. The differences within each treatment family (comparing payoff-
equalizing messages between T100 and T50, as well as between P100 and P50) are not significant. 
Result 4: Compared to the baselines, the emission of payoff-equalizing messages is significantly lower in both 
P-treatments. 
Sender beliefs                      Treatments  
T100 T50 P100      P50 
First-order beliefs about receiver actions Means 
Percentage of receivers accepting the message 45.18 41.88 61.00       53.97 
Second-order beliefs about relative payoffs Percentages 
Higher or much higher than sender’s payoffs 29.17 22.62 46.67       21.88 
Peer group beliefs Percentages 
Other senders likely/very likely to deceive     
Scenario 1 (low+;low-) 76.39 76.19 26.67       53.13 
Scenario 2 (low+;high-) 68.05 73.81 40.00       37.50 
Scenario 3 (high+;high-) 68.06 71.42 66.67       78.13 
     Table 3 
     Sender beliefs across treatments. 
Given the importance of beliefs on subjects' decisions in games focusing on information transmission (see 
e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010), we first examine their potential role as a driver of sender behavior 
in each treatment. The descriptive outcomes are summarized in Table 3. While senders expect receivers to 
accept a message with probabilities of 45% and 42% in the baselines, these first-order beliefs increase to 
61% and 54% in the treatments with punishment. According to a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, the 
difference between T100 and P100 is significant at the 0.01 level and, respectively, with p=0.014 between 
T50 and P50. The corresponding distributions are displayed in Figure 4 and are consistent with our 
finding that receivers actually show more trust when punishment is possible as presented in section 5.2. 
According to a chi2-test, second-order beliefs do not vary significantly between the punishment 
treatments and the respective baselines. With regard to peer beliefs, we find a significant difference 
comparing T100 with P100 in scenario 1 (p<0.01) and a marginally significant one in scenario 2 
(p=0.051). Between T50 and P50 peer beliefs are only significantly different in scenario 2 (p<0.01). In 
these cases, substantially fewer senders expect other players in their role to deceive their counterpart 
when there is a possibility for being punished. In scenario 3, in which stakes are high, subjects do not 
expect their peers to behave differently with and without punishment. 
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     Figure 4 
     Box plots of sender first-order beliefs. 
  
Result 5: Senders anticipate an increased acceptance rate by the receivers when punishment is possible. Peer 
beliefs show situational differences. 
In order to shed further light on the reasons for the stable deterrence effect in the three payoff scenarios 
when disclosure probability is halved, we compare sender beliefs between P100 and P50. According to 
our expected utility analysis, payoff-maximizing senders should exhibit a higher willingness to deceive 
when the probability of disclosure is decreased. Since neither the experimental environment nor nominal 
payoffs differ between treatments, applying our theoretical framework, the stable deterrence effect could 
only be due to a change in the senders’ subjective probabilities of message acceptance p or enforced 
punishment q, which could reduce the increased expected payoff in P50 to a level similar to the one in 
P100. Surprisingly, we do not find a significant difference in the senders’ first-order beliefs or punishment 
considerations between P50 and P100 (Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests).  
We turn now to assess a potential explanation for the stable deterrence effect, based on strategic sender 
behavior. The first one would be that in the P-treatments only those subjects deceive who do not  expect 
to be punished by their counterparts anyway and, hence, would not be affected by the change in detection 
probabilities. However, we find that a substantial fraction of senders in our experiment, who deceived 
their counterpart in P100 and P50, actually considered in their decision the possibility of being punished. 
This fraction varies between 40% (scenario 2 in P50) and 100% (scenario 2 in P100). The second 
explanation would be that in the P-treatments only those subjects are honest who consider the possibility 
of being punished by their counterparts and, hence, abstain from deception independently of the change 
in detection probabilities. In our setting, we also find heterogeneity among the honest senders with 
regards to punishment considerations, since between 17% (scenario 2 in P50) and 33% (scenario 2 in 
P100) of the senders were honest in the P-treatments although they did not take into consideration the 
possibility of being punished. Therefore, we can also rule out that only those senders were honest 
(dishonest), who expected (did not expect) to be punished for deception and, hence, they are not 
responsible for the stable deterrence effect. 
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Since no strategic components change between P100 and P50 in a way that could explain the stable 
deterrence effect, we argue that the main driving force behind it can only be attributed to anticipated 
psychological costs of being punished for deceiving others. This explanation is in line with Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) as well as Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) who find that punished subjects indeed suffer 
from negative emotions related to the experienced sanction. Furthermore, it seems as if such 
psychological costs are not related to guilt-aversion. Second-order beliefs vary significantly between the 
two punishment treatments according to a chi2-test (p=0.039), indicating that, when the disclosure 
probability decreases, comparatively fewer senders believe that their counterparts expect relatively high 
payoffs from the message. Also, when comparing the social norm-related peer beliefs within each 
treatment family, we only find a significant difference between the punishment treatments in scenario 1 
(p=0.034), implying that other senders are more often expected to deceive when the probability of 
disclosure is only 50%. 
Result 6: The stable deterrence effect cannot be attributed to a change in strategic components such as the 
senders’ first-order beliefs or punishment considerations. We hypothesize that the effect is due to anticipated 
psychological costs of being punished for deception. 
In order to investigate to which extent beliefs affect sender behavior in our design, we use probit 
regressions for each payoff scenario with a dependent variable that takes the value 1 in case the sender 
chose to send an honest message.15 We include the interactions of treatment effects and the senders' first-
order beliefs as independent variables. Our expected utility analysis predicted that senders would most 
likely send honest messages within p-ranges located approximately on the right side of the T-treatment 
indifference point at p=0.33. Therefore, we leave the low p-tertile between 0 and 0.33 as the baseline. We 
also include second-order beliefs, peer beliefs and gender as additional independent variables. The 
second-order belief variable takes the value 1 whenever senders believe that their counterpart expects to 
achieve a comparatively higher payoff whereas the peer belief dummy takes the value 1 in case senders 
expect their peers to send a deceptive message in the respective scenario. The results of the probit 
regressions are presented in Table 4. 
The models confirm the deterrence effect of punishment in our setting when individual beliefs and gender 
are taken into account. Senders who believe that receivers will accept their message with an intermediate 
or high probability are significantly more likely to send honest messages in all scenarios of the P-
treatments. Additionally, in scenario 3, in which a sender can gain a comparatively higher amount from 
deception, expecting the receiver to follow with an intermediate or high probability leads to accordingly 
less honesty in the treatments without punishment. These models allow us to directly compare the 
coefficients of the respective variables with different disclosure probabilities. Although our theoretical 
model predicts a weaker punishment effect when the probability of revealing the sender's dishonesty 
decreases, the P50 coefficients are not significantly different from the P100 coefficients in any scenario. 
                                                 
15 We do not use multinomial regressions to control for the three types of sender behavior (honesty, deception and payoff-
equalization) since there are only few or even no observations regarding payoff-equalizing messages in the P-treatments. 
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These findings confirm that the effect of our punishment mechanism does not change between the two 
different disclosure probabilities even when beliefs and gender are taken into account. 
Treatment, belief and  
gender effects 
Scenario 1  
(low+;low-) 
Scenario 2  
(low+;high-) 
Scenario 3 
(high+;high-) 
Honesty 
T50 x first-order>0.33 -0.167 (0.248)   0.056 (0.237) -0.497* (0.272) 
T100 x first-order>0.33 -0.039 (0.257) -0.200 (0.252) -0.581** (0.291) 
P50 x first-order>0.33   1.367*** (0.355)   0.877*** (0.331)   0.868*** (0.308) 
P100 x first-order>0.33   1.244*** (0.392)   0.883*** (0.338)   1.044*** (0.319) 
Second-order_more   0.544** (0.213) -0.074 (0.206)   0.219 (0.213) 
Peer_group_lying -0.770*** (0.199) -0.761*** (0.186) -0.372 (0.237) 
Female   0.187 (0.193) -0.121 (0.185)   0.380* (0.199) 
Constant -0.071 (0.218)   0.389* (0.205) -0.500* (0.255) 
N 218 218 218 
LR chi2 64.48*** 44.04*** 47.10*** 
Pseudo R2 0.2140 0.1358 0.1721 
      Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
     Table 4 
     Probit regression models for sending honest messages in each scenario. 
Second-order beliefs, on the other hand, are only significant in scenario 1, in the sense that senders are 
more likely to choose honest messages when they believe that their counterpart expects to gain a 
relatively higher profit in the scenario in which the payoff misalignment is relatively low. With regard to 
peer beliefs, the relative probability of choosing an honest message is lower when a sender expects the 
majority of the other players in their role to deceive in a specific scenario. This is true for scenarios 1 and 
2, but not for scenario 3 in which senders face comparatively high financial incentives to deceive. In 
contrast to other findings in sender-receiver games like Dreber and Johannesson (2008) and Gneezy and 
Erat (2012), we find no significant gender effects regarding dishonesty at conventional levels. 
We conclude from these results that punishment, in combination with first-order beliefs, is the overall 
driving factor for decisions between sending honest and dishonest messages in our design, while other 
beliefs seem to exhibit more situational effects. To explain this pattern it is important to make a 
distinction between the belief types. First-order beliefs have an actual relevance for strategic sender 
actions. Since receivers undertake the task of finally implementing the payoff-determining option, 
strategic senders have to incorporate in their decision the probability of message acceptance. On the one 
hand, given the substantial impact of punishment that we observed, strategic considerations become 
obsolete when a sender is forced to be honest in order to avoid a sanction. On the other hand, in case a 
sender actually considers deceiving his counterpart regardless of the possibility of being punished, which 
we observed for a particular fraction of subjects, first-order beliefs become relevant, regardless of the 
scenario. The guilt aversion-related second-order beliefs and beliefs about perceived social norms among 
peers are rather related to emotional motivations and have only limited relevance for strategic 
considerations resulting in scenario-specific effects. 
Result 7: Punishment and first-order beliefs are the driving factors for sending honest messages, while the 
influence of other belief types is comparatively more sensitive to the underlying payoff scenario. 
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Finally, we aim at identifying an explanation with respect to why payoff-equalizing messages nearly 
disappear with punishment, and have a closer look at a specific form of the sender's first-order beliefs. 
This dummy variable takes the value 0 in case the sender expects the receiver he is matched with to reject 
the message, i.e., these senders choose payoff-equalizing messages strategically in order to get one of the 
remaining options implemented. As presented in Table 5, on average, over 90% of the senders who chose 
the payoff-equalizing message in the T-treatments believed that their counterpart would reject their 
message and, hence, have chosen this message for strategic reasons. 
Payoff-equalizers per treatment and scenario        Treatments 
T100 T50 P100 P50 
Scenario 1     
Number of payoff-equalizers  18 15 1 0 
Percentage of payoff-equalizers with FOB=0 83.3% 93.3% 0% - 
Scenario 2     
Number of payoff-equalizers  15 9 2 1 
Percentage of payoff-equalizers with FOB=0 86.7% 100% 0% 0% 
Scenario 3     
Number of payoff-equalizers  16 13 1 1 
Percentage of payoff-equalizers with FOB=0 87.5% 92.3% 0% 0% 
            Table 5 
            Payoff-equalizing senders and their direct first-order beliefs (FOB) per treatment and scenario. 
By contrast, all the remaining payoff-equalizers believed that their counterpart would actually implement 
the option mentioned in the message in the P-treatments. This indicates that the effectiveness of 
punishment does not only depend on the action per se but also on the intention with which the action is 
taken, even in a situation where the potential punisher does not receive information about the true 
intention of the defector and no communication between the two parties is possible to set the record 
straight. We conclude that punishment does not only successfully reduce the transmission of deceptive 
messages but also eliminates strategic sender actions in the sense of maximizing payoffs by promoting the 
Pareto-dominated outcome while expecting the receiver to reject the message. 
Result 8: Our punishment mechanism works in the sense of a positive selection screen, eliminating strategic 
sender actions. 
5.2 Receiver behavior 
Receivers take on an active role in our design in terms of deciding whether the option mentioned in the 
message will actually be implemented or not. Since they do not get any information about the players' 
payoffs from each option, accepting a message can be considered as an act of trust and rejection as 
distrust in our setting. Therefore, a comparison of the message acceptance rates across treatments, as 
presented in Figure 5, allows us to make a statement about how punishment and disclosure probabilities 
affect the trust levels. 
We find that only 33% and, respectively, 48% of the receivers accept the messages in the T-treatments, 
while trust levels are substantially higher in the punishment treatments, 70% in P100 and 78% in P50. 
The differences between T100 and P100 as well as T50 compared to P50 are significant at the 0.01 level 
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according to a chi2 test. Hence, we can confirm our H5 about receivers being more likely to accept 
messages in the P-treatments compared to the respective baselines. 
 
       Figure 5 
       Acceptance rates per treatment. 
Regarding the variation of disclosure probabilities, we find a higher acceptance rate in T50 compared to 
T100. This difference is marginally significant (p=0.071). However, the acceptance rates in the P-
treatments are not significantly different and, therefore, we cannot confirm our H6. We conclude that 
receivers seem to anticipate that punishment provokes a substantial deterrence effect independently of 
the disclosure probability, a finding that supports our notion that monitoring effort could be reduced in 
our punishment setting while maintaining the levels of honesty. 
Result 9: Receivers trust their counterparts significantly more often when they are able to punish dishonest 
senders, showing similarly high trust levels in the punishment treatments independently of the disclosure 
probability. 
We now turn to the receivers' beliefs. In Table 6 we present the respective means and percentages of first-
order, second-order and peer beliefs. In contrast to second-order expectations, first-order beliefs are 
significantly different, at the 0.01 level, between T100 and P100 according to a Mann-Whitney rank-sum 
test, in the sense that more receivers expect senders to send an honest message when punishment is 
possible. In line with our previous findings, comparatively more receivers believe that the other players in 
their role will accept the message in the P-treatments, independently of the disclosure probability. A chi2 
test shows significant differences at the 0.01 level when comparing T100 with P100 and, respectively, T50 
with P50. 
Receiver beliefs                      Treatments  
T100 T50 P100 P50 
First-order beliefs about sender actions Means 
Percentage of senders sending honest message 34.50 40.46 56.17 47.38 
Second-order beliefs about relative payoffs Percentages 
Higher or much higher than receiver's payoffs 29.17 28.57 30.00 34.38 
Peer group beliefs Percentages 
Other receivers likely/very likely to accept 43.06 42.86 80.00 68.75 
    Table 6 
    Receiver beliefs across treatments. 
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We use probit models, in which we control for treatment effects, individual beliefs and gender, to compare 
message acceptance among the punishment treatments and their respective baselines. The independent 
variable of this model measures if a receiver rejects (value 0) or accepts (value 1) the sender's message. 
We present two specifications of each model. In specification (1), we include dummy variables for the 
possibility of being punished and another for gender. As shown in Table 7, the relative probability of 
accepting a message increases when sanctioning is possible under both disclosure probabilities. The 
coefficient for punishment in P50 is not significantly different from the one in P100, confirming our earlier 
finding that the trust level is not higher with an increased probability of revealing sender behavior. 
  Treatment, belief 
  and gender effects  
P50 P100 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Punishment   0.769*** (0.289)   1.074*** (0.391)  0.952*** (0.285)   0.413 (0.362) 
First-order_honest     0.056*** (0.010)     0.031*** (0.009) 
Second-order_more   -0.426 (0.366)   -0.789** (0.381) 
Peer_group_accept   -0.186 (0.346)     0.700** (0.339) 
Female -0.283 (0.246) -0.473 (0.342)   0.081 (0.263) -0.066 (0.319) 
Constant -0.112 (0.203) -1.799*** (0.427) -0.478** (0.217) -1.666*** (0.379) 
N  116  116  102  102  
LR chi2  10.56***  75.65***  11.77***  49.04***  
Pseudo R2  0.0664  0.4754  0.0841  0.3504  
    Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
   Table 7 
   Probit regression models for accepting messages comparing T50 with P50 (left) and T100 with P100 (right). 
This pattern appears in a more pronounced form when we include the receivers' beliefs in specification 
(2). The possibility of punishing dishonest senders after accepting a message is still a main driving force 
for trusting senders in P50 while first-order beliefs also show a significant and consistent effect on 
acceptance rates in the sense that receivers are more likely to accept a message when they expect senders 
to be honest. 
On the other hand, the pure treatment effect of P100 does not have a significant impact on receiver 
decisions when individual beliefs are taken into account. All three belief types show a significant effect on 
message acceptance and seem to overlay the punishment threat in P100, which is in line with our 
previous observation that first-order beliefs are only significantly different between T100 and P100. 
Beside the aforementioned first-order belief effect, receivers trust their counterparts less if they believe 
that senders have high relative payoff expectations according to the significantly negative effect of second-
order beliefs on message acceptance. Furthermore, receivers are more likely to trust a sender when they 
expect their peers to accept the messages they received. Again, we do not find significant gender 
differences. 
Result 10: We find a strong effect of punishment on trust in P50 but not in P100, as it is mediated by the 
change in beliefs. 
We finally examine whether possible punishments are actually enforced by receivers. First of all, there are 
only few receivers who are able to sanction their counterpart, due to the fact that the vast majority of 
senders chooses honest messages in the P-treatments. The respective rates of punishment possibilities are 
13.3% in P100 and 18.8% in P50, as presented in Table 8. Interestingly, we find that only two out of four 
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possible punishments in P100 are enforced. The enforcement rate in P50 is even lower with one out of six 
receivers. It is surprising that so few receivers actually sanctioned their counterparts without having to 
bear any monetary costs in this anonymous setting.  
 
  Treatment 
Possibilities         
to punish 
Enforced 
punishments 
  P100 4  (13.3%) 2 (50%) 
  Scenario 1 0 0 
  Scenario 2 3 1 
  Scenario 3 1 1 
  P50 6  (18.8%) 1 (16.67%) 
  Scenario 1 1 0 
  Scenario 2 1 0 
  Scenario 3 4 1 
    Table 8 
    Punishment enforcement rates. 
We expected more enforced punishments when the computer selected the 'mean' scenario 2, in which the 
sender can gain a comparatively low amount from deception at a high relative cost for the receiver. 
Altogether, there were four cases in which punishment was possible in scenario 2, out of which only one 
was finally enforced. In the other two cases, in which punishment was enforced, scenario 3 was previously 
selected by the computer, indicating that the punishment decision might have been taken rather 
independently of the underlying payoffs. These findings have to be interpreted with caution, given the 
overall low number of punishments, but show a potential for further research. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we first identified a potentially well-functioning punishment system against deception in 
principal-agent relationships. We further investigated how the possibility to punish dishonesty affects 
behavior in a one-shot deception game with different probabilities of disclosing dishonesty and compared 
this behavior to the case without punishment possibilities. Since receivers found out about their 
counterpart's behavior with the same probability after the game was played in the paired treatments, we 
were able to tell apart the deterrence effect of potential punishment from the image concerns caused by ex 
post disclosure, which alone can lead to less deception.  
In contrast to many previous results, we showed that a substantially higher fraction of senders acts 
honestly when a cost-free and severe punishment mechanism is present. By using a within-subject 
comparison of different payoff scenarios, we also found that the deterrence effect of punishment is less 
pronounced when senders face the temptation of gaining a comparatively high amount from deception. 
On the other hand, senders seem to be unaffected by the financial consequences of deception in terms of 
the receiver's relative loss when facing the possibility of being sanctioned. Furthermore, our punishment 
mechanism works in the sense of a positive selection screen, eliminating the strategic sending of payoff-
equalizing messages, while leaving a fraction of truly inequity-averse senders unaffected. 
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With regard to the different disclosure probabilities, a subjective equilibrium analysis predicts that our 
punishment mechanism should lead to a lower rate of honest messages when the probability of revealing 
sender behavior is halved. Interestingly, we did not observe a significant difference in the fractions of 
honest messages in any scenario comparing assured revelation with 50% disclosure probability. By 
analyzing subjects' beliefs and punishment considerations, we can rule out a change in strategic 
components and suggest that the stable deterrence is observed due to anticipated psychological costs of 
being punished for deception. Our conclusion from this stable deterrence effect of punishment is that 
monitoring effort could be reduced in similar settings while maintaining a level of honesty similar to the 
one of complete disclosure. Besides a potential reduction in agency costs, this implication is particularly 
important regarding the existence of thresholds above which monitoring is able to create crowding-out 
effects, in the sense that agents can even reduce their norm adherence when they are monitored 
excessively (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008, Ichino and Muehlheusser, 2008). 
Receivers, on the other hand, show substantially higher trust levels when they are able to sanction 
dishonest senders. We conclude that punishment in principal-agent relationships in which deception is 
possible does not only lead to more honesty but enhances trust levels accordingly, even in a setting 
without repeated interactions. This is an important condition since both senders and receivers are active 
players and an intact economic relationship can only be established when all involved parties actually 
agree to interact with each other. Even a perfectly working deterrence mechanism is not an optimal tool if 
it does not convince principals to establish economic relationships in the first place. Furthermore, the 
difference between the high acceptance rates in the punishment treatments is not significant, implying 
that receivers anticipate that the punishment's deterrence effect is independent of our variation in the 
disclosure probabilities. 
However, we find surprisingly low enforcement rates. Since sanctioning was cost-free and not-profitable 
to the enforcer in our design, we assume that the majority of receivers were reluctant to punish because of 
an emotional discomfort resulting from the severity of the sanction. Our results might be an indication for 
the act of punishing being not only linked to emotions like anger about the unethical act or guilt for 
otherwise forgone opportunities to punish (see Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009), but also to pity in terms 
of an anticipation of anger and guilt that the punished one experiences (Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009). 
This  might result in opposing motivations of the involved party with respect to the enforcement of 
punishment as in Whitson et al. (2015), based on the severity of the sanction in relation to the size of the 
norm defection. 
Since we focus on cost-free punishment in terms of a sanction implemented by a central authority in our 
design, an open question for further research would be how different disclosure probabilities interact 
with a variety of punishment costs. Given that we fixed the disclosure probabilities exogenously, an 
additional potential for further investigation would be to allow for an endogenous monitoring level. As 
shown in the model of Buechel and Muehlheusser (2014), the deterrence effect of punishment can even 
decrease when the central authority delegates the monitoring task to an autonomous agent with own 
interests. Furthermore, the introduction of repeated interactions with sanctioning possibilities, as in 
Kimbrough and Rubin (2013), could cast some light on the stability of the deterrence effect of cost-free 
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punishment and on the sanction enforcement rates under different disclosure probabilities in the long 
run. 
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APPENDIX A 
  
Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz (2007)  Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz (2009)  Peeters et al. (2013) 
  Game structure 2 options with misaligned payoffs 2 options with misaligned payoffs 2 options with misaligned payoffs 
  Ex ante transparency  
  (conflicts of interest) 
yes yes yes 
  Ex post transparency 
  (conflicts of interest) 
yes yes yes 
  Punishment severity 100% of the earnings 100% of the earnings 100% of the earnings 
  Punishment costs 100% of the earnings 100% of the earnings 100% of the earnings 
  Punishable actions all all all 
  Number of rounds 50 50 60 + 40 
  Alternating roles yes yes yes 
  Specific features   costly option to remain silent institution choice in later stages 
  Findings regarding 
  punishment 
punishment does not 
reduce deception 
punishment does not 
reduce deception 
punishment does not reduce 
deception, except for self-selected 
punishment groups in the 
institution selection phase 
  Church & Kuang (2009)  Xiao (2013) Kimbrough & Rubin (2013)  
  Game structure value assessment (coins) 2 options with misaligned payoffs trust game with pre-play messages 
  Ex ante transparency  
  (conflicts of interest) 
no/yes no yes 
  Ex post transparency 
  (conflicts of interest) 
yes 
enforcers: yes 
receivers: no 
yes 
  Punishment severity 25 out of {100-140} 50% of the earnings 
20% of initial endowment 
+ outstanding amount 
  Punishment costs 10 out of {100-200} no costs 
20% of initial endowment 
if jury denies punishment 
  Punishable actions dishonesty all dishonesty 
  Number of rounds 1 3 scenarios 10 
  Alternating roles no no no 
  Specific features 
outside option for receivers; 
punishment decision before 
final outcome is shown 
third-party punishment; 
varying punishment profitability; 
varying receiver information 
jury system 
  Findings regarding 
  punishment 
punishment reduces deception 
only with ex ante disclosure of 
conflicts of interest 
punishment reduces deception; 
but no effect when punishment is 
profitable or when receivers are 
not informed of punishments 
punishment reduces deception 
from the beginning 
Table A.1 
Parameters of selected experimental studies examining punishment effects on deception. 
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions for the experimental subjects (translated from Spanish) 
Welcome to this experiment, we greatly appreciate your participation. From this moment on, please 
switch off your cell phone and do not talk or communicate in any way with the other participants. Read 
these instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any questions during the session. One of the 
officials of the experiment will answer your questions individually. 
Your decisions in this experiment will allow you to earn a certain amount of money that we will pay you in 
cash at the end of the session.  
You will be a player in a two-player game. Your partner will be one of the participants in this session, 
randomly assigned by the computer. None of you will know the identity of the partner at any time. One of 
you will be assigned the role of "Player 1" and the other the role of "Player 2". 
You will interact with your partner only once and this will take place through the computers. After this 
interaction, the experiment will end and you will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire.  
Decision Making Player 1 
During the experiment we will present three scenarios to Player 1, each one them contains three options. 
Each option consists of a payoff for Player 1 and a payoff for Player 2. This is the general structure of the 
options in each scenario that will be presented to Player 1: 
 
Option A: Player 1 receives ... euros and Player 2 receives ... euros. 
Option B: Player 1 receives ... euros and Player 2 receives ... euros. 
Option C: Player 1 receives ... euros and Player 2 receives ... euros. 
 
We will present to Player 1 the payoffs for both players of each option and in each scenario (the order of 
the options is at random). By contrast, Player 2 will not get this information. Player 1's task is to choose 
one of the following three messages that will be sent to Player 2 afterwards: 
 
Message 1: Option A will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 2: Option B will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 3: Option C will earn you more money than the other two options. 
 
Remember that there are three scenarios. That means, Player 1 has to decide, in each scenario, which 
message she wants to be sent to Player 2.  
After Player 1 has chosen a message for each scenario, the computer will randomly select one of the 
scenarios. This scenario will then be implemented and the specific message that Player 1 chose for this 
scenario will be sent to Player 2. From this moment on, it depends on the decision of Player 2 which of the 
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three corresponding options will be implemented and, according to this, which amount of money both 
players will earn. 
Decision Making Player 2 
Player 2 knows about the three options in the selected scenario but she knows nothing about the earnings 
associated with each option. The only information that Player 2 receives is the message that Player 1 
chose for the implemented scenario.  
After receiving player 1’s message, Player 2 takes her decision, which is either to "accept" or "reject" the 
message. To "accept" the message means that Player 2 accepts the information of the message and that the 
option mentioned in the message determines the earnings of the two players. On the contrary, to "reject" 
the message means that Player 2 does not want the option mentioned in the message but another option 
to determine the earnings of both players. Therefore, if Player 2 accepts the message, the option in the 
message will be implemented and determines the payoffs of the players. In the case that Player 2 rejects 
the message, one of the remaining options of the selected scenario will be randomly implemented by the 
computer in order to determine the earnings of both players. 
Earnings 
Before your earnings are shown on the screen, you will answer some short questions. After that, Player 1 
will receive information about the acceptance or rejection of her message, the implemented option 
corresponding to the scenario that was selected by the computer and the earnings of both players. 
[Treatment T100: 
Player 2 will receive information about her own earnings corresponding to the implemented option. 
Furthermore, Player 2 will receive information about all potential payoffs for both players of each options in 
the scenario that has been implemented.] 
[Treatment T50: 
In principle, Player 2 will only receive information about her own payoff corresponding to the implemented 
option. Furthermore, a possibility exists that the computer decides to provide additional information to 
player 2 about all potential payoffs for both players of each option in the implemented scenario. The 
probability of this happening is 50%.] 
[Treatment P100: 
Player 2 will receive information about her own earnings corresponding to the implemented option. 
Furthermore, Player 2 will receive information about all potential payoffs for both players of each options in 
the scenario that has been implemented.  
If player 1 sent a false message that was accepted, Player 2 will then have the possibility to punish Player 1 by 
reducing his profits to 2 euros.] 
 
 
33 
 
[Treatment P50: 
In principle, Player 2 will only receive information about her own payoff corresponding to the implemented 
option. Furthermore, a possibility exists that the computer decides to provide additional information to 
player 2 about all potential payoffs for both players of each option in the implemented scenario. The 
probability of this happening is 50%.  
If player 1 sent a false message that was accepted, Player 2 will then have the possibility to punish Player 1 by 
reducing his profits to 2 euros.] 
The final earnings will be presented on the last screen. 
After that we will pay you anonymously and in cash the amount that corresponds to your final earnings in 
the game.  
Do you have any questions about these instructions? If so, please raise your hand. If you do not have any 
questions, remain silent until you get instructions from the experimenter. 
APPENDIX C 
Under standard economic theory, a sender would never send honest messages in the T-treatments since 
the expected utility of sending honest messages is lower than the one from sending deceptive messages 
for all p > 0.33:
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The expected utility of sending honest messages is lower than the one from sending payoff-equalizing 
messages for all p < 0.33:
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Accordingly, EUT(A) = EUT(B) = EUT(C) in case p =
3
1
. 
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Value ranges of p in which honesty is the dominant strategy exist in the punishment treatments with   
πi(A) = €5, π1,2(B) = €6, π3(B) = €15, πi(C) = €3 and a reduction to πS = €2 in case of a sanction: 
p-ranges P100 P50 
Scenarios 
1 & 2 
q
p
q 83
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Scenario 3 
q
p
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Table C.1 
Value ranges of p in which honesty is the dominant strategy in the punishment 
treatments applied to scenario-specific payoffs. 
When we give up our simplicity assumption of zero costs of lying, we obtain the following p-ranges in 
which honesty is the dominant strategy, for instance, in scenario 1 and 2 in P100:  
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 in case q < 0.375;  p
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 in case q > 0.375 
Accordingly, we find the following p-ranges for scenario 1 and 2 in P50: 
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